Bio-energy and CAP Reform: The Gains to Europe and Africa by Plesch, Dan et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bio-Energy and CAP Reform: 
 
The Gains to Europe and Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
Dan Plesch 
Greg Austin 
Fiona Grant 
Stephen Sullivan 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2006 
 First published in 2006 by 
The Foreign Policy Centre 
49 Chalton Street 
London NW1 1HY 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Email: info@fpc.org.uk 
 
© Foreign Policy Centre 2006 
 
 
All rights reserved 
ISBN-13: 978 1 903558 86 2 
ISBN-10: 1 903558 86 7 
 
 
 
   
About the Authors 
Dan Plesch, Senior Associate at the Foreign Policy Centre, initiated 
work at the Royal United Services Institute on Energy Security, 
organising a number of conferences and seminars. He has written on 
the subject in the Guardian, Independent and Observer, and  in 
several book chapters. Dan joined the Foreign Policy Centre as a 
Senior Associate in 2005. He is a writer, broadcaster and consultant 
on geo-political strategy. He is the author of The Beauty Queen's 
Guide to World Peace; a Research Associate at the Centre of 
International Studies and Democracy in the University of London's 
School of Oriental and African Studies, a Visiting Senior Research 
Fellow at Keele University. Previously he was Senior Research 
Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and founding Director of 
the Washington DC based, British American Security Information 
Council.  His other current research focuses on terrorism, nuclear 
weapons and the origins of the UN.  
 
Greg Austin joined the Foreign Policy Centre as Director of 
Research in 2004 after holding senior posts in the Department of 
Peace Studies at Bradford University and the International Crisis 
Group in Brussels. His previous appointments were in the Australian 
National University, the Australian parliament, and the Australian 
government. His government service included appointments as a 
Ministerial adviser, defence intelligence analyst, and a diplomatic 
post in Hong Kong. His books include China's Ocean Frontier: 
International Law, Military Force and National Development (1988), 
Japan and Greater China: Political Economy and Military Power in 
the Asian Century (2001), and The Armed Forces of Russia in Asia 
(2001). He holds a PhD and Master's degree in International Law.  
 
Fiona Grant contributed to the pamphlet while working as a Project 
Officer at the Foreign Policy Centre, working primarily on the Energy 
Security Programme. Previously, Fiona worked at the European 
Commission in President Barroso’s office, building on her experience 
in Public Affairs.  Fiona received a BA in Modern Languages from 
Cambridge University.  
 
Stephen Sullivan graduated from Warwick University in 2005 with a 
BA in Politics and Sociology. After working as a research assistant 
on energy security at the Foreign Policy Centre he is currently 
assisting the secretariat of the all-party Parliamentary Group for 
Energy Studies. 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Foreign Policy Centre or Oxfam. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
The Foreign Policy Centre and the authors would like to thank Oxfam 
for its support of the research and publishing of this pamphlet. 
  i 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
In December 2005 at world trade talks in Hong Kong, the EU agreed 
− along with the USA and Japan − to end farm trade subsidies by 
2013. On the eve of the talks, the EU released a biomass action plan 
which provides another lever for ending subsidies in agriculture to 
support Europe’s energy security. Even modest new efforts to 
increase biomass energy use could reduce projected EU energy 
imports in 2010 by as much as 12 per cent. The moves would boost 
rural employment by creating up to 300,000 new jobs. 
 
The process for ending farm trade subsidies by 2013 is hostage to 
complex bargaining arrangements in two quite different spheres. The 
first, within the framework of the World Trade Organisation, links 
reductions in EU farm subsidies not only to cuts in US and Japanese 
farm subsidies but also to a liberalisation by developing countries of 
their barriers to trade in services and investment. The second, within 
the framework of the EU itself, links a phasing out of the subsidies 
not only to the interests of affected farmers and bigger commercial 
entities but also to larger issues of the entire EU budget process. 
 
At the same time, many developing countries suffer quite negative 
effects from high energy prices: a sustained ten dollar increase in the 
price of oil per barrel can reduce the GDP of some African countries 
by as much as three per cent in the following year. The EU itself is 
trying to make important adjustments in its own patterns of energy 
use in order to mitigate global climate change and enhance energy 
security. 
 
This pamphlet argues that the EU can find a new impulse for more 
rapid progress in all of these spheres through a policy of redirecting 
the price subsidies from sugar and some other crops to support of 
biomass energy production, especially for ethanol vehicle fuel and 
heating.  
 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the framework through 
which the EU price subsidies are made, is widely regarded within 
Europe, the USA and among many developing countries as a highly 
corrupted one. The EU has begun to reform the CAP so that it can 
meet its original goal of supporting rural communities and promoting 
rural development. But the process of CAP reform is slow and highly 
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controversial. The administration of CAP remains mired in secrecy; 
middle men, as much as farmers, are now key beneficiaries of it. The 
CAP is an affront to modern standards of transparency and 
accountability at the national level and, at the international level, to 
the principles of an open trading system and the G-8/EU 
commitments to promoting development of the poorest countries. 
The EU spends more on CAP than on aid to the developing 
countries. 
 
Biomass energy production can be an engine of regeneration of rural 
communities at the same time as sustaining production of crops like 
sugar that are currently regarded as the main ‘villain’ in the CAP 
drama. On the one hand, biomass industries normally result in a high 
proportion of profits being retained in the area of production. In some 
cases, as much as 80 per cent of profits remain within 50 miles of 
the source of the biomass crops. On the other hand, the diversion of 
EU-produced sugar from its current end uses to production of 
ethanol for transport fuel on the scale seen in Brazil or the USA 
could reduce the need for the EU to prop up sugar sale prices 
through large scale subsidies and other trade barriers. 
 
The EU also stands to make gains in energy security from the 
decentralisation and diversification of supply that greater use of 
some forms of biomass energy can provide. 
 
An important spin-off from a greater EU engagement with biomass 
energy production will be a greater capacity to support the energy 
production capacity of developing countries, many of which are 
mainly agricultural economies that have a far greater reliance on 
biomass than EU countries. Reduction of the burdens on developing 
economies imposed by high oil prices has not figured as prominently 
as it might in its development assistance policies.   
 
The EU is facing historic choices in how it manages farm support, 
energy use and climate change mitigation. It faces a choice between 
allowing national priorities and disaggregated interest groups (such 
as the agriculture lobby) to set the agenda or trying to set a unified 
pan-European, integrated approach. The considerations raised in 
this pamphlet suggest that the latter course is the only viable one. 
National governments throughout the EU, like local governments and 
community stakeholders, especially farmers’ groups, will be a vital 
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part of framing forward action. But there needs to be a common EU 
vision. Part of that vision must be a commitment to more rapid and 
more radical moves. 
 
The course of action recommended in this pamphlet is in many 
respects a simple one. At the same time, implementation will require 
detailed elaboration involving the many stakeholders, and this 
consultation will need to be informed by expert analysis of the 
national and international issues in economic, political and social 
domains. 
 
This pamphlet does not seek to replicate specific recommendations 
on linking farm subsidies to greater support for biomass that are 
already on the table through various mechanisms. Rather, the 
pamphlet identifies several strategic recommendations for EU 
leaders, including in parliaments. The strategic recommendations are 
followed by some sample measures that could be implemented fairly 
promptly. 
 
Recommendations 
 
The EU should commit now to additional and urgent reform 
measures in the CAP that promote rapid take-up of biomass 
energy use in ways that reduce the negative effects on 
agricultural trade of poorer countries created by price 
subsidies. 
 
Leading members of the EU (such as the UK) that support a 
radical reform of CAP and of the EU budget should commission 
a specialist assessment of the various options for shifting farm 
subsidies under CAP to vigorous promotion of biomass 
production as part of a comprehensive package of rural 
development measures. EU leaders must not limit their 
consideration of CAP reform only to traditional agricultural trade 
aspects but bring into play issues of energy security and rural 
development. There should be a short time frame on this 
assessment, say six months. 
 
In terms of lower level measures that could be investigated in the 
shorter term, three areas of policy stand out for immediate attention. 
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The EU, member states and regional authorities should give 
immediate tax relief and other support to investment in biomass 
processing facilities, especially large scale plants for ethanol, 
and to new distribution networks for biomass products.  
 
Measures which provide some form of tradable credits in 
biomass energy will allow for the operation of market forces.  
 
The EU must use its own more rapid shift to biomass use as a 
new lever of change in its support policies to developing 
countries seeking energy security. The EU must make 
renewable energy programmes a higher priority in its 
development assistance. In Africa, where the EU has just 
promised to double aid disbursements for the next five years, 
the EU could agree to spend ten per cent of the new funds 
(some $2 billion per year) on promotion of new biomass crop 
plantings and more efficient biomass energy production. 
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In the year following a $10 oil-price increase ... the 
loss of GDP averages 0.8 per cent in Asia and 1.6 per 
cent in very poor highly indebted countries. The 
annual loss of GDP in the Sub-Saharan African 
countries would be more than 3 per cent. 
International Energy Agency 
2004 
 
In the short term, conventional biofuel production 
processes in IEA countries could help reduce oil use 
and thence greenhouse gas emissions, although the 
costs may be high. In the longer term, possibly within 
the next decade, advances in biofuel production and 
the use of new feedstocks could lead to greater, more 
cost-effective reductions. Countries such as Brazil are 
already producing relatively low-cost biofuels with 
substantial reductions in fossil energy use and 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
International Energy Agency 
May 2004 
 
In New York, Governor George Pataki issued an 
executive order that requires all state agencies and 
public authorities to increase their purchase and use 
of biofuels for heating their facilities and fueling their 
vehicles. The order mandates that by 2012, biodiesel 
must supply 10 percent of the fuel used in the state 
fleet, at which time biodiesel will also supply at least 5 
percent of the heating fuel used in state buildings. 
November 2005 
 
Research that has been undertaken in the UK 
suggests that there is a lack of understanding 
generally about biomass as a renewable energy 
resource. 
Scottish Executive 
December 2005 
  
Introduction 
Two of the most pressing global issues facing the European Union 
(EU) and its member states are increasing dependence on the 
import of energy, principally oil and gas, and the continuing poverty 
of millions of people in the developing world. These two problems 
have rarely been linked in public statements by the EU. The 
possibility of strong synergies between the policies needed to 
address the first (energy security at home) with poverty eradication 
has never been seriously addressed in any detail by the EU.1 
 
The EU recognises that one factor in the persistence of poverty in 
developing countries is their inability to compete in trade in 
agricultural goods on an equal footing because of farm subsidies and 
tariffs imposed by the major traders (EU, USA and Japan). This 
pamphlet investigates the nexus between policies needed to address 
the energy security of Europe and those involved in reducing the 
subsidies the EU currently applies to agricultural trade. In recent 
years, the UK has spent as much money undermining the trade 
prospects of developing countries through farms subsidies as it has 
on its development assistance to developing countries. The two 
policies are not just out of synchronisation. They are diametrically 
opposed. 
 
The main assumption in the pamphlet is one about domestic politics. 
The governments in the EU that currently disburse large amounts of 
farm subsidies to keep rural production alive need to find new ways 
to get those funds into their rural communities at the same time as 
the funds are redirected away from the current subsidies that so 
distort the agricultural trading potential of poorer countries. The 
pamphlet argues that this can be done through a redirection of the 
funds to support new fuel crops, new biomass production of other 
                                                 
1 There are short references to the possible impact on the Common Agricultural Policy 
and developing country trade of greater EU reliance on renewable energy sources in 
the European Commission’s ‘Biomass Action Plan’ released as a provisional version 
on 7 December 2005. For the text, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/res/ 
biomass_action_plan/doc/2005_12_07_comm_biomass_action_plan_en.pdf. 
Plesch, Austin, Grant, Sullivan 
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sorts (for heating),2 and the new rural infrastructure and industrial 
capacity to process those products into energy. 
 
Thus, there are several planks of EU policy, currently un-aligned, 
that could be brought together to meet agreed goals for reform of 
farm subsidies, energy security for EU countries, and trade gains for 
developing countries. One inevitable consequence of a move in this 
direction would be to help developing countries themselves achieve 
energy security through greater reliance on renewable energy 
sources. 
 
The EU has already given a strong commitment to significant policy 
change in these broad areas of policy, not least its promise at the 
world trade talks in December 2005 − along with the USA and Japan 
− to end farm trade subsidies by 2013. 
 
On energy security at home, the European Union, in partnership with 
the USA, committed itself on 29 June 2005 to ‘stronger actions to 
increase energy security’.3 On the energy needs of poorer countries, 
the EU and US both recognised in the same statement that ‘one of 
the greatest needs for developing countries today is to provide the 
basic energy services necessary to lift their citizens out of poverty’. 
They agreed to help developing countries ‘reduce poverty by 
promoting energy efficient policies and the use of renewable energy 
sources’.  
 
In the interests of climate change mitigation and environmental 
protection, the EU has committed itself to a collective 2010 target of 
22 per cent of power consumption from renewable sources, including 
biomass. (The national contributions to that target vary considerably 
                                                 
2 ‘Biomass’ is a term used for organic materials that act as a source of energy either 
by being converted to liquid fuel for the transport sector or by being burnt in power 
plants. Wood burning is one of the oldest forms of fuel. Energy crops include 
conventional crops such as wheat and oil seed rape and dedicated energy crops such 
as short rotation willow coppice, grasses and forestry products. Biomass includes in 
addition to energy crops, woody biomass and the residues of the wood working 
industry, agricultural residues and agrifood effluents, manures as well as the organic 
fraction of municipal solid waste or source, separated household waste and sewage 
sludge. A more technical definition is: ‘All non-fossil-based living or dead organisms 
and organic materials that have an intrinsic chemical energy content’. See Elsevier, 
Encyclopedia of Energy, 2004, http://www.bera1.org/cyclopediaofEnergy.pdf. 
3 EU-US Summit Communique, 20 June 2005, http://www.eu2005.lu/ 
n/actualites/communiques/2005/06/20ue-us05/. 
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for a host of reasons: 70 per cent for Austria, 21 per cent for France 
and 10 per cent for the UK.) For biofuels’ share of all fuel 
consumption, the Commission has set a non-mandatory target for 
2010 of 5.75 per cent. There is no EU target for biomass share of 
heating production. 
 
In the interests of fair global trade in agriculture, the EU has 
committed itself to reducing ‘those farm subsidies which distort 
international trade and harm the interests of developing countries’.4 
In October 2005, in advance of the trade talks in Hong Kong, EU 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson and EU Agriculture 
Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel offered to cut farm subsidies by 
an average of up to 70 and 80 per cent and to reduce agricultural 
tariffs by between 35 and 60 per cent depending on the product.5 At 
the talks, the EU agreed to cut farm trade subsidies completely by 
2013. 
 
The window of opportunity to address how the nexus between farm 
subsidies, energy security and developing country interests is now 
wide open. The WTO has just agreed to end farm trade subsidies.6 
The G8 at Gleneagles in July 2005 committed itself both to 
improving assistance to developing countries and advancing global 
energy security, and the protection of the climate, through among 
other things, recourse to renewable energy sources.  The UK has 
already produced a biomass policy report. There are many other 
circumstances, not least a projected steady increase in global 
demand for food and rising prices for oil, that make prompt and 
effective consideration of this new nexus both an opportunity and a 
necessity. 
 
A strategy that led to improved global markets for developing country 
trade in agriculture by shifting EU production towards fuel crops and 
other biomass outputs would have other benefits. These would 
                                                 
4 See European Commission, ‘EU Agricultural Trade Policy in the Round’, 17 
November 2005, accessible from: http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/cfm/ 
oclib_type.cfm?type=10. 
5 See http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/ 
655&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
6 ‘We agree to ensure the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and 
disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect to be completed by the end of 
2013.’ See Final Declaration, Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting, December 2005, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm. 
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include reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving the EU’s 
energy security. 
 
The pamphlet has four main sections. The first section gives a broad 
global overview of biomass use for energy. The second section looks 
at the current state of play and projected policy environment for EU 
official support to biomass industries. The third section addresses 
the question of whether existing farm subsidies that so negatively 
distort the trade potential of developing countries can be shifted to 
support measures for energy production from biomass. This section 
argues that the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
which is often painted as the ‘villain’ in this drama of agriculture 
subsidies, can support a shift to new biomass sources. One part of 
this section illustrates the argument with more specific reference to 
current sugar subsidies, seen by most as the ‘arch villain’ in the 
drama. The fourth section reviews in brief the very small place that 
support of biomass plays in existing EU development assistance 
programmes. The pamphlet concludes with a brief recap of the main 
argument and policy recommendations. 
Biomass in the World: New Agriculture 
for New Energy 
Biomass is a term used for organic materials that act as a source of 
energy either by being converted to liquid fuel for the transport sector 
or by being burnt in power. Biomass is the only natural, renewable 
carbon resource existing in sufficient quantities large enough to be 
used as a substitute for fossil fuels: ‘Unlike fossil fuel deposits, 
biomass is renewable in the sense that only a short period of time is 
needed to replace what is used as an energy resource’.7 This 
pamphlet uses the term ‘bioenergy’ as short-hand for biomass 
energy. 
 
Bioenergy does produce carbon dioxide emissions, but in the case of 
fuel crops these emissions are counteracted by re-absorption by the 
plants grown to replace them. Fuel crops are therefore theoretically 
‘emissions neutral’ in the cycle of production and use, but actually 
                                                 
7 Encyclopedia of Energy. 
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produce a net cut in emissions to the extent that they eliminate a unit 
of fossil fuel consumption for the first time. 
 
Compared to other renewable energy sources that are intermittent, 
such as wind and solar, biomass energy sources have the 
advantage of being storable with present technology. In addition, 
production units can range from small scale up to multi-megawatt 
size. Biomass, unlike other renewables and nuclear power, has the 
potential for continuous generation of electricity. 
 
The production of energy from biomass, with the exception of 
anaerobic digestion, involves the production of useable volumes of 
heat. This production of heat alone can give energy extraction 
efficiencies of 80 per cent or more and is not limited to particular 
parts of the country, unlike geothermal systems. 
 
Some International Comparisons 
 
Energy produced from biomass is already a standard feature of daily 
life around the planet, though the patterns of use are quite variable 
depending on the location. Biomass energy can be highly 
competitive economically, according to the market conditions and 
government policy settings. For example, since the Brazilian Ethanol 
Programme was launched in 1975, it remains the largest commercial 
application of biomass for energy production in the world.8 In 
response to oil shocks, the government introduced tax incentives 
that made ethanol fuel prices at the pump and ethanol-powered car 
prices highly attractive to consumers. Since 1979, 5.4 million ethanol 
powered cars have entered the Brazilian market. 
 
Table 1 on the next page shows a comparison of biomass share of 
total energy consumption for the top ten energy consuming 
countries, five additional industrialised countries and five developing 
countries. (The countries are listed in order of total energy 
consumption.) The use of biomass in developing countries is 
addressed in more detail in the second to last section of this 
pamphlet. 
 
                                                 
8 See for details: http://www.renewables2004.de/ppt/Presentation4-SessionIVB(11-
12.30h)-LaRovere.ppt. 
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The comparisons indicate at a very crude level that some 
industrialised countries (such as the UK, Japan and South Korea) 
are a long way short of their potential for transition to biomass. 
These laggard countries are a long way behind both EU leaders 
(Latvia and Finland), but also behind a developing country like Brazil 
which has a total energy consumption not much smaller. The UK is a 
long way behind the USA, France and Germany in the field of 
biomass use, biomass technology and biomass awareness. Of 
particular note, biomass energy has surpassed hydropower in the 
USA as the primary source of renewable electric power.9 
 
Table 1: Biomass share of Total Energy Consumption10 
 
Country Total Con-
sumption 
(eJ/yr) 
Biomass 
Share 
(%) 
 Country Total Con-
sumption 
(eJ/yr) 
Biomass 
Share 
(%) 
USA 99.85 3.4 
 
Brazil* 7.80 23.9 
China* 47.25 19.6 
 
Indonesia 6.32 32.6 
Russia* 26.18 1.2 
 
Australia 4.78 4.9 
Japan  22.78 1.1 
 
Sth Africa 4.67 11.6 
India* 20.84 41.2 
 
Vietnam 1.60 61.2 
Germany 14.74 2.5 
 
Finland 1.44 20.4 
France  11.16 4.4 
 
Austria 1.24 10.9 
Canada  10.90 4.5 
 
New Z’land 0.81 6.5 
UK 10.10 0.9 
 
Tanzania 0.67 93.6 
Sth Korea 8.41 1.1 
 
Latvia 0.16 22.4 
 
More importantly, the comparisons in Table 1 suggest (again at a 
crude level) that technological advances and growth of biomass use 
in developed countries will be especially important to developing 
countries since they rely heavily on biomass for their energy needs. 
Bioenergy in the Developing World: The Lion’s Share 
Over two billion people in the developing world use biomass for the 
majority of their household energy needs. In some countries, 
                                                 
9 See US Department of Energy, ‘The Biomass Economy’, http://devafdc.nrel. 
gov/pdfs/6748.pdf. 
10 Encyclopedia of Energy, citing IEA report from 2002. The data presented in Mtoe 
were converted to EJ/year using a multiplier of 0.043412. The data for those countries 
marked with an asterisk are for 1999; the remaining data are for 2000. 
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biomass is the primary source of all energy in the entire economy. 
For example, as shown in Table 3, biomass accounts for 93.6 per 
cent of total energy consumption in Tanzania. While per capita 
energy consumption is considerably less in developing countries 
than in industrialised ones, the rate of growth in developing world 
energy consumption is three to four times greater.11 
 
In developing countries, particularly rural areas, biomass is widely 
used in households for heat and cooking. Yet its use is generally 
both highly inefficient and detrimental to the health of those most 
exposed to it. Moreover, with the global threat of deforestation – 
caused by the clearing of land for agriculture and for commercial 
timber – shortages of wood fuel are set to emerge. Resulting 
desertification threatens communities dependent on wood fuel, who 
do not benefit from the support required to regenerate the trees and 
shrubs.  
 
In terms of efficiency, a study by Energy Conversion and 
Management estimates that 326 million tonnes of biomass fuel could 
be saved through efficiency improvements in China, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam alone.12 This can 
be done through introducing more efficient stoves into communities. 
Stoves can be improved through constructing a chimney to remove 
smoke from the kitchen.  
 
In recent decades, many programmes have been established to 
distribute improved stove technologies in developing countries. In 
China, over 177 million such stoves have been installed so far. In 
India, over 25 million improved stoves had been installed by 2003.13 
Also in terms of biomass for electricity generation and co-generation 
for electricity and heat, these emerging economies have taken a 
lead. India has launched the world’s largest cogeneration 
programme for sugar mills. Facilities have also been introduced for 
improved transportation of biomass. 
 
                                                 
11 http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12008.htm. 
12 S. C. Bhattacharya, R. A. Attalage, M Augustus Leon, G. Q. Amur, P. A. Salam and 
C. Thanawat, 'Potential of biomass fuel conservation in selected Asian countries', in 
Energy Conversion and Management, (1999) 40, pp. 1141-1162. 
13 Ministry of Non-conventional Energy Sources (MNES), India, 
http://mnes.nic.in/frame.htm?majorprog.htm. 
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Trade in Bioenergy and Related Technologies 
 
Many biomass products, and all of the associated production plants 
and technologies, can be traded internationally. For example, while 
Sweden is one of the largest producers in Europe of biodiesel, it is 
also a large importer of the finished product. Germany, also a large 
producer, imports significant amounts of the rapeseed it needs for 
production.14 Pakistan, Brazil and Guatemala are the biggest 
exporters of ethanol to the EU. Pakistan and six other countries 
export ethanol to the EU under a no tax regime because of a 
dispensation given in EU counter-narcotics policy. In the EU, Italy 
and the Netherlands are the biggest ethanol importers. 
 
Since biomass energy products and agricultural inputs can be 
traded, any policy shift toward subsidised production will need to be 
evaluated for its potentially negative effects on the agricultural trade 
prospects of developing countries. Annex 10 of the provisional 
version of the EU biomass action plan released in December 2005 
gives an overview of EU trade relations in ethanol.15 
 
Advantages of Bioenergy: Rural Communities Win! 
 
One of the important distinguishing features of biomass production 
compared with fossil fuels is that the former sets up new chains of 
investment and supply that can benefit rural communities. According 
to one industry source, in the USA, 80 per cent of all revenue 
generated by an ethanol facility is spent within a 50 mile radius of the 
plant, thereby creating substantial pockets of rural economic 
development’.16 This potential is borne out by a range of studies. An 
assessment for the US Southeast concluded that industrial wood 
energy generated 71,000 jobs and one billion dollars of income 
annually. Another scenario-based assessment conducted for the 
state of Wisconsin identified the potential for three times more jobs, 
                                                 
14 See US Department of Agriculture, ‘EU-25 Oilseeds and Products: Biofuels in the 
European Union 2005’, 23 March 2005. 
15 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/res/biomass_action_plan/doc/2005_12_07_ 
comm_biomass_action_plan_en.pdf. 
16 BBI International, http://www.bbibiofuels.com/ethanol_info/study.html. 
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earnings, and sales in Wisconsin than the same level of imported 
fossil fuel usage.17 
 
The European Commission has assessed that even a conservatively 
estimated increase in biomass use in the EU would by 2010 produce 
up to 300,000 new jobs, mostly in rural areas. Biomass energy is 
many times more employment intensive than fossil fuels: 50-100 
times more jobs for bio-fuels and 10-20 times for bio-electricity.18 
 
The potential economic impact on rural communities in Europe of a 
shift to production of inputs for biodiesel is high. According to a study 
commissioned by several local authorities and other agencies in 
Scotland, small scale production of crushed oilseed for biodiesel at 
low capital cost but with higher production costs than larger scale 
production, the economic impact on the rural economy would be 
good if there were sufficient production to stimulate a supply chain.19 
 
Limitations of Bioenergy: The Policy Settings? 
 
Unlike gas, though like oil, biomass energy has to be stored by the 
user. Transportation of it is expensive due to the bulky nature of the 
produce. Biomass energy use has economic and environmental 
impacts and affects carbon emissions balances. There are important 
constraints on the transition to biomass energy, but these have been 
overcome in many countries through effective policy.  
 
                                                 
17 This study assumed a 75 per cent increase in the state’s renewable energy use by 
2010 (775 MW of new electric generating capacity to supply electricity to 500,000 
Wisconsin homes and 379 million litres (100 million gallons) per year of new ethanol 
production to supply gasohol to 45 per cent of Wisconsin’s automobiles. New 
investment was equivalent to 62,234 more job-years of net employment, $1.2 billion in 
higher wages, and $4.6 billion in additional output. Over the operating life of the 
technologies analysed, about $2 billion in avoided payments for imported fuels would 
remain in Wisconsin to pay for the state-supplied renewable resources, labour, and 
technologies. Wood, corn, and waste biomass contributed 47 per cent of the increase 
in net employment. See Encyclopedia of Energy. 
18 EU Biomass Action Plan released on 7 December 2005, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/res/biomass_action_plan/doc/2005_12_07_comm_b
iomass_action_plan_en.pdf. 
19 E. Booth, J. Booth, P. Cook, B. Ferguson and K. Walker, ‘Economic Evaluation of 
Biodiesel Production from Oilseed Rape grown in North and East Scotland: Executive 
Summary’, SAC Consultancy Division, October 2005. http://www.sac.ac.uk/ 
mainrep/pdfs/biodieselreportsummary.pdf. 
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The UK Biomass Task Force 2005 Report recognises that recent 
changes in oil fuel prices had changed the relative cost of biomass 
energy. In some circumstances biomass may even now be the best 
option, though this is rarely recognised by investors. According to the 
report, the potential supply of usable biomass is large20 and the 
potential to use biomass to reduce UK CO2 emissions is significant. 
And the use of biomass contributes to energy security and rural 
development. 
 
The main constraints have not been market forces as much as lack 
of knowledge and lack of imagination. The UK report found that: 
 
In spite of more than one-third of primary energy being used 
for heat there has been a lack of recognition of the role of 
renewable heat in policy delivery. The approach could be 
characterised as - no targets; no concerted policy; no 
strategy; and, limited support for development.21 
 
The report also found that energy crops ‘have been a victim of the 
stop-start approach to biomass energy’ inflicted by Government: ‘this 
has created uncertainty in the industry and has not led to the level of 
progress needed to pull through the new varieties which have been 
in development’. The report advocated a need to ensure that 
‘biomass energy is driven by market development and has access to 
a full range of feedstocks which offer the potential to utilise the most 
appropriate feedstocks for the situation’. The report called for greater 
public recognition of the investments already made by the private 
sector ‘in response to Government direction to develop energy crops 
as feedstocks for heat, electricity and in co-firing’. 
                                                 
20 The Biomass Task Force report to Government, October 2005. ‘Our vision 
statement suggests that around 1 million hectares of land may be available for non-
food uses in general. This could mean, on current yields, around 8 million tonnes of 
energy crops. Around 5-6 million tonnes of wood waste is currently generated per 
annum. Of this around 1.4 million tonnes were recovered in 2004. Studies suggest 
that an additional 1.5 million tonnes of high quality waste wood and around 2-3 million 
tonnes of contaminated waste wood could potentially be recovered. Waste, which has 
substantial resources, needs to be quantified to include dry and wet waste via 
Anaerobic Digestion.’ 
21 Foreword by Sir Ben Gill, The Biomass Task Force report to Government, October 
2005. 
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Bioenergy Tomorrow: Role of Technology 
There has to be a new vision of technological advance for promotion 
of biomass. According to a US assessment, ‘biomass can’t fully 
replace the huge volumes of petroleum and other fossil fuels that we 
now use, but it can provide fuels and chemicals comparable to those 
derived from petroleum. American farmers and foresters can fuel as 
well as feed and house America—in a sustainable fashion’.22 The 
USA has an established vision for biomass and backs it with 
investment in R&D.23 
 
There is a strong contrast between the promotion of biomass 
technological advance in the USA and that in the EU, particularly in 
the UK. In fact, the UK sits at the bottom of the table in international 
comparisons of major countries in terms of most categories of 
energy R&D.24 Between them and individually, the USA and Japan 
have far more impressive spending rates on R&D for renewable 
energy sources than the EU. The trend in energy R&D spending in 
general, and for renewables, has been largely negative for the past 
twenty years in key countries, including the UK. According to the 
study cited above in this paragraph: 
 
The historical apex of renewable energy R&D investment 
occurred in the early 1980s following the OPEC oil supply 
shocks, investments in several countries (e.g., the U.S., Italy, 
Canada, Netherlands, France, and Spain) began to rise 
again in the mid-1990s and, in many cases, continue to 
grow.25 
 
                                                 
22 ‘The Biomass Economy’. 
23 The US government set up its first renewable energy laboratory in 1974 and this 
was renamed in 1991 as the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and 
designated as a national laboratory of the US Department of Energy (DOE). It is the 
principal research laboratory for the DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy which provides the majority of its total funding of some US$200 million per 
year. Other funders that contribute to this total include the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), the World Bank, the US National Science Foundation 
(NSF), the United Nations Foundation, and the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID). 
24 Paul Runcie, Energy R&D Investment Patterns in IEA Countries: An Update, 
October 2005, http://www.globalchange.umd.edu/publications/PNWD-3581.pdf. 
25 Ibid. p. 9. 
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The main exception for renewables R&D spending in the EU has 
been wind energy R&D, but even here the increase has been 
devoted mainly to deployment of systems. 
Bioenergy in Europe 
On 7 December 2005, the European Commission released a 
provisional version of its Biomass Action Plan, a paper which 
advocated the need for the EU ‘to respond strongly’ to the challenge 
posed by Europe’s increased dependency on imported energy. This 
paper noted that the European Council in Spring 2004 concluded 
that increased use of renewable energy is essential for 
‘environmental and competitiveness reasons’.  
The Current Picture 
The paper noted that the EU currently meets four per cent of its 
energy needs from biomass. It assessed that if the EU made full use 
of its potential, it could increase its biomass use by 2010 by a factor 
of around 2.6. At the same time, the Commission assessed that the 
EU was not likely to realise its full potential in this area, but more 
likely to double its use. This section sketches current EU use of 
biomass. 
 
In one sector of bioenergy, Europe is the leading global producer. In 
2004, there were 11 countries among the EU 25 producing biodiesel. 
The growth curve has been very steep, with Germany’s 2004 
production increasing by almost 45 per cent. One of the main 
reasons for this rapid growth in Germany has been a tax-free regime 
for biodiesel. Germany overtook France as the EU leader in biodiesel 
production in part because of the latter’s less favourable tax regimes 
and regulatory environment. 
 
In another biofuel sector, ethanol, Europe is also active and even 
though its production is small compared with that of Brazil or the 
USA, the ethanol industry is also growing at a fast rate: about 16 per 
cent in 2004 over 2003 in terms of volume. Europe produced about 
four times more biodiesel by volume than ethanol. Like the biodiesel 
market, there are powerful regulatory constraints on the ethanol 
market in many countries of Europe. These need radical overhaul. 
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As for biomass heating, the situation in Europe is somewhat similar: 
a strong commercial sector in some countries and a virtually non-
existent one in others. Although biomass-fired electricity is at or 
below the margin of profitability, the use of biomass to provide heat 
in industrial and commercial settings, with continuous demand, 
already looks to be competitive with oil and gas.26 Biomass already 
provides a significant share of EU heating: some 13 per cent in 2002 
as shown in Table 2 below.27 
 
Biomass-fired electricity is at or below the margin of profitability. At 
present, it provides only a small share (1.3 per cent) of EU electricity, 
as shown in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 2: Heat in the EU 
 
Source Amount (TJ) Share (%) 
- coal 253682 23.7 
- oil 67524 6.3 
- gas 475003 44.3 
- biomass 139767 13.0 
- waste 100251 9.4 
- nuclear 0 0.0 
- geothermal 474 0.0 
- solar thermal 37 0.0 
- other sources 35159 3.3 
Total Heat Production 1071897 100.0 
Energy Sector 5651  
Distribution Losses 91488  
Total Final Consumption 974758  
Industry  231703 23.8 
Agriculture  10503 1.1 
Commerce and Public Services 165981 17.0 
Residential  503191 51.6 
Other Non-Specified 63380 6.5 
 
                                                 
26 Renewable Heat and Heat from Combined Heat and Power Plants – Study and 
Analysis, Future Energy Solutions (FES) from AEA Technology, August 2005. This 
report suggests that the current costs of creating heat for commercial continuous 
demand are £21MWh from biomass, £18MWh from gas and £22MWh from oil. 
Equivalent figures for industrial heat are £17MWh (biomass), £20MWh (oil) and 
£27MWh (gas). 
27 See IEA Statistics, http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/heatdata.asp?country= 
European+Union&SubmitA=Submit. 
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Table 3: EU Electricity28 
 
Source Unit: GWh Share (%) 
- coal 712939 26.6 
- oil 168823 6.3 
- gas 496707 18.5 
- biomass 33939 1.3 
- waste 22290 0.8 
- nuclear 893809 33.3 
- hydro 309805 11.6 
- geothermal 4761 0.2 
- solar PV 279 0.0 
- solar thermal 0 0.0 
- other sources 37180 1.4 
Total Electricity Production 2680532 100.0 
Domestic Supply 2726585  
Heat Plants 3536  
Energy Sector 251465  
Distribution Losses 165221  
Total Final Consumption 2306363 100.0 
Industry 967915 42.0 
Transport 61545 2.7 
Agriculture 37306 1.6 
Commerce and Public Services 569444 24.7 
Residential 664645 28.8 
Other Non-Specified 5508 0.2 
 
EU Initiatives for Bioenergy 
 
The EU set policy in renewable energy in 1997 and this was followed 
by a series of legal directives and further policy papers from 2001 
onwards: 
 
 1997 white paper: Energy for the Future: Renewable 
Sources of Energy29 set an overall target of 12 per cent 
for renewables’ share of total power by 2010 across the 
EU. It outlined a ‘Bioenergy Initiative for Transport, Heat 
and Electricity’, in order to increase the market share for 
liquid bio-fuels above 0.3 per cent. The paper identified 
reduction of production costs of bio-fuels as a high 
priority since they were at that time three times the price 
of conventional fuels. The paper also recognised the 
                                                 
28 Source: IEA Statistics, http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/electricitydata.asp? 
country=European+Union&SubmitA=Submit. 
29 European Commission, ‘Energy for the future: Renewable Sources of Energy – 
White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan’, COM (97) 599, 1997. 
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need for a high rate of tax relief and subsidised raw 
material production, along with encouragement for take-
up through demonstration programmes and ‘fair’ access 
to the electricity market. 
 
 2000 green paper: Towards a European Strategy for 
Security of Energy Supply, the Commission set the 
objective of 20 per cent substitution of conventional fuels 
by alternative fuels in the road transport sector by 
2020.30 
 
 2002: Intelligent Energy for Europe Programme (2003-
2006),31 to follow the framework programme ended on 
31 December 2002. With a budget of around 200 million 
EURO this programme implements the strategy outlined 
in the green paper.  
 
 2003 Commission directive: Promotion of the use of 
biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport32 set an 
indicative target for the share of biofuels in total fuel 
consumption at two per cent in 2005 and 5.75 per cent 
in 2010 of total fuel consumption in the transport sector 
in the EU.  
 
 January 2004: an additional annual aid payment of EUR 
45 per hectare for energy crops was introduced as part 
of the recent round of CAP reform.33  
                                                 
30 European Commission, Green Paper, ‘Towards a European strategy for security of 
energy supply, final’, COM (2000)769, 2000. 
31 European Commission, ‘Adopting a multi-annual programme for action in the field of 
energy: “Intelligent Energy for Europe” Programme (2003 – 2006)’, COM (2002) 169 
final/2, 2002. 
32 European Commission, ‘Promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels 
for transport’, Directive 2003/30/EC. 
33 To be eligible for the subsidy, the crops need to be covered by a contract with a 
processing company or the farmers must process the product themselves. Evaluating 
the effectiveness of this subsidy is difficult since it was only introduced in January 
2004. Aside from the price, a limiting factor is that the subsidy is available for a 
Europe-wide maximum of 1,500,000 hectares of set-aside land. 
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EU Biomass Consultation 
Between February and March 2005, the Commission’s Directorate 
General for Transport and Energy (TREN) produced a consultation 
report in preparation for the drafting of its biomass action plan.34 
Among hundreds of recommendations touching on other matters, 
the Commission received 47 proposals for amendment to the CAP 
regulations, which were ‘seen as a major barrier for bioenergy 
growth’. These submissions are not available on the public record 
from the Commission. In particular, the Commission identified 
proposals for support for short-rotation forestry and herbaceous 
energy crops to be increased, mainly in terms of increasing the size 
of the supported land area. The Commission cited the view in the 
proposals that this would also provide benefits in other areas of 
policy, such as environment (CO2 reduction) and rural development. 
 
Some 38 proposals called for the harmonising of bioenergy trade 
regulations at EU level and the creation of an EU bioenergy market. 
The Commission summarised the proposals to the effect that the 
lack of coherent trade framework at EU level for bio-feedstocks, solid 
biofuels, transport biofuels, bioelectricity, etc., similar to that for fossil 
fuels, is the major reason for the lack of well-functioning bioenergy 
market in the EU. Bioenergy trade is often inefficient or blocked by 
artificial barriers. 
 
The consultation produced 31 proposals that called for stability and a 
long-term perspective in bioenergy support policies. Since these are 
decisive factors for investors, there were calls to avoid flooding the 
market with too many regulations. 
 
The consultation produced 20 proposals calling for import 
restrictions (tariffs and non-tariff measures) on bioenergy in order to 
‘secure the development of the emerging bioenergy industry in the 
EU’. This was particularly relevant for the imports of ethanol, for 
which larger supply at lower cost (compared to the EU) is available 
through import. 
 
Other proposals noted that the slow or partial implementation at 
national level of EU regulatory acts that promote bioenergy was a 
                                                 
34 Assessment of the responses to the questionnaire on the EU Biomass Action Plan, 
DG Joint Research Centre, Institute for Energy (SETRIS). 
Bio-Energy and CAP Reform 
 
17
major reason for the delayed growth of bioenergy in the member 
states. 
 
The consultation received proposals for country-specific action. For 
the UK, the proposals were as follows: 
 
 Promote bioheat and small-scale CHP via bioheat renewable 
obligation certificates; 
 Simplify and harmonise the administrative (renewables 
obligations), tax and funding procedures and regulations; 
 Bio-residues from forestry, agriculture and other similar 
sectors not to be considered as waste, but as fuels; 
 Consider external costs of fossil fuels and the advantages of 
bioenergy/energy saving, CO2 credits and trading; 
 Promote energy crops cultivation nearby power and heating 
plants; 
 Raise awareness for public authorities to use bioenergy;  
 Support the development of bioenergy technologies e.g. via 
capital grants for processing facilities; 
 No or lower excise duty for transport biofuels, extended in 
time; 
 Establish, support and optimise supply chains, with particular 
attention to vegetable and animal residues; 
 Standardisation of bioenergy fuels and technologies; 
 Mandatory targets and blending shares for biofuels, 
introduction of transport biofuels renewable certificates; 
 Drop the duty on pure plant oil; 
 Promote biomass co-firing with coal, increase biomass co-
firing fraction; 
 Open the natural gas transmission grid to biogas. 
UK Biomass Report 
In 2004, the UK launched a study to help its private sector develop 
biomass energy in support of the country’s renewable energy targets 
and sustainable farming objectives. The final report of the Biomass 
Task Force was published on 25 October 2005.35 It made a series of 
recommendations including: 
 
                                                 
35 Biomass Task Force: Report to Government, London, 2005, 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/acu/energy/biomass-taskforce/btf-finalreport.pdf. 
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 A second round of the Bio-energy Infrastructure Scheme;36 
 The development of producer groups or co-operatives, with 
initial responsibility being taken by the RDAs to analyse the 
infrastructure needs in their region and seek to facilitate 
supply chain development; 
 The establishment of quality standards and certification to 
ensure that feedstocks of appropriate quality to be used 
within given conversion technologies; 
 The use of life cycle analysis to ensure that the carbon 
impacts of different options are understood; 
 The continuation of the Energy Crops Scheme, including 
planting grants and producer group support; 
 The amendment of the Entry Level Scheme to recognise the 
biodiversity and other environmental benefits of energy 
crops; 
 The need for research into new feedstock options, such as 
short rotation forestry. 
 
The report also made a series of recommendations for the EU. It 
called for careful analysis of options under the Common Agriculture 
Policy to promote bioenergy. It noted that existing measures (the 
continuation of set-aside and the ‘bureaucracy associated with the 
m45/hectare energy crops payment’) are ‘regarded by many as 
market distortions and barriers rather then helpful support’. It called 
for better EU cooperation and the introduction of appropriate support 
by Member States, including regulation to help stimulate activity. 
EU Biomass Action Plan: December 2005 
In releasing the EU’s Biomass Action Plan37 on 7 December 2005, 
Commissioner for Energy, Andris Piebalgs, said it had three goals:  
 
 Cut greenhouse gas emissions; 
 Protect jobs in rural areas and; 
                                                 
36 This was a government scheme to provide grants to farmers, foresters and 
businesses to help develop the supply chain needed to harvest, store, process and 
supply energy crops and woodfuel to endusers. The last application window closed in 
February 2005. 
37 For the text of the EU Biomass Action Plan released on 7 December 2005, see 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/res/biomass_action_plan/doc/2005_12_07_comm_b
iomass_action_plan_en.pdf. 
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 Reduce Europe’s dependence on imported energy.38 
 
The plan included a large number of measures, including: 
 
 Promotion of ‘biofuels obligations’, through which 
suppliers include a minimum proportion of transport 
biofuels in the fuel they place on the market; 
 An open trade (‘balanced approach’) in transport 
biofuels, ensuring that market opportunities are open 
both domestic producers and foreign producers – 
including those from least developed countries; 
 Examining how biofuel use could count towards CO2 
emission targets for car fleets; 
 Reporting on how certificates could be used to ensure 
minimum standards of cultivation for the raw materials 
used to make transport biofuels; 
 Investment in research in second generation biofuels, 
especially production of liquid fuels out of wood and 
waste materials; 
 Work towards a proposal for Community legislation to 
encourage the use of renewable energy in heating (the 
missing piece of the jigsaw alongside existing legislation 
on renewable energy in transport and electricity); 
 Reviews of how fuel standards could be improved to 
encourage the use of biomass for transport, heating and 
electricity generation;  
 A campaign to inform farmers and forest owners about 
energy crops. 
 
Of particular note to developing countries, the Action Plan said that 
the EU would provide special support to those that want to produce 
and use transport biofuels. 
 
There were a number of specific measures affecting the EU’s rural 
support policies and the future reform of the CAP. These included: 
 
 Assess the implementation of the existing energy crop 
scheme; 
                                                 
38 See http://www.managenergy.net/products/R876.htm. 
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 Finance a campaign to inform farmers and forest holders 
about the properties of energy crops and the opportunities 
they offer; 
 Bring forward a forestry action plan in which energy use of 
forest material will play an important part; 
 Review the impact of the energy use of wood and wood 
residues on forest based industries; 
 Consider how the waste framework legislation could be 
amended to facilitate the use of clean wastes as fuel; 
 Review how the animal by-products legislation could be 
amended in order to facilitate the authorisation and approval 
of alternative processes for the production of biogas and 
other biofuels. 
 
Progress towards EU targets 
 
The potential of energy farming remains to be realised despite 
strong support in some EU circles. The European Biomass 
Association estimates that, taking into account a projected increase 
in energy consumption, the growth rate of renewable energy sources 
must double if the EU target of 12 per cent share is to be met by 
2010.39 Biomass market penetration alone has to be tripled, with 
current electricity production from biomass falling well short of the 
sub-target of 19 per cent by 2010. A 2003 study suggests that the 
situation is even more disappointing than these figures suggest. It 
concluded that only 7 per cent of the proposed increase in bioenergy 
use has been achieved in 15 years.40 
 
Progress within the EU on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
has similarly been poor. The European Environment Agency stated 
in its 2002 report that decreases in greenhouse gases in the EU 
have been insufficient, with a shortfall of 3.3 per cent to reach the 
EU target of 8 per cent reduction between 1990 and 2010.41 
 
As far as the UK is concerned, progress on use of biofuels has been 
summarised by the government in 2005 as follows: 
                                                 
39 AEBIOM manifesto 2004. 
40 H. Kopetz, ‘Bioenergy in Europe’, in proceedings of the Nordic Bioenergy 
Conference, 2003. 
41 EEA, 2002: Energy and environment in the European Union, Environmental issue 
report, No 31. 
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 Negligible quantities of bioethanol were used in road 
transport until the introduction of a duty incentive in January 
2005; 
 The UK is well on course to meet its target of 0.3 per cent  of 
total UK fuel sales by the end of 2005. This would represent 
a ten-fold increase on 2004 sales.42 
 
The UK report cited here noted that although the European 
Commission does not require member states to set a 2010 target 
until July 2007, ‘responses to the UK's public consultation indicated a 
strong preference to set a target as soon as possible’. As a result, 
the government announced that it is considering a possible target for 
2010 and the measures needed to meet any target, including a 
possible Renewables Transport Fuel Obligation. 
Fair Farm Trade as Stimulus to 
Bioenergy 
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the reform 
processes currently under way in it provide a policy framework that 
can deliver a significant new stimulus to production and use of 
biomass energy. The CAP has become much more than a 
framework for delivering farm subsidies. It is now a ‘comprehensive 
rural development policy which supports the diversification, 
restructuring and evolution of rural areas and economies’ throughout 
the EU.43 A ‘strengthened rural development policy with more EU 
money’ is a fundamental part of the policies agreed by the EU in its 
CAP reform package announced in 2003.44 EU leaders have 
significant room for manoeuvre in delivering a wholesale transfer of 
much of the money currently being spent on subsidies, especially in 
respect of sugar, to rural communities in ways that stimulate biomass 
energy production. 
 
                                                 
42 See ‘UK Report to the Commission on Biofuels 2005’, 5 July 2005, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/res/legislation/doc/biofuels/member_states/rapports
_2005/2003_30_uk_report_en.pdf. 
43 European Commission, The Common Agricultural Policy Explained, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf. 
44 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/capreform/index_en.htm. 
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One of the virtues of CAP is that, in terms of financial flows, it has 
been a national programme operating under the cover of an 
intergovernmental EU-wide strategy for rural and agricultural 
development.  
 
Most importantly, in the consideration of reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, leaders have not given bio-energy farming the 
attention it deserves. There has been some recognition of the need 
to stimulate the biomass industry through CAP.  
 
CAP Reform: More Radical Approaches Needed 
 
The EU has launched a make-over of its agricultural policy under 
pressure from several directions. Born out of the post-war desire to 
guarantee European self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs, CAP 
remained largely unchanged into the 1990s as a rigid, production-
oriented policy. The proportion of the EU budget absorbed by CAP 
has dropped from two-thirds to under a half (around EUR 50 billion 
per year), and is set to drop to one third in ten years’ time.45 Yet 
agriculture accounts for less than two per cent of Europe’s economic 
output. 
 
A major reform agenda was agreed in March 1999, prompted by the 
need to prepare the CAP for the future enlargement of the EU to 
include the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This agenda 
was viewed as a golden opportunity to move support for over-
production towards a market-orientated, environmentally-friendly 
CAP, designed to promote efficient and sustainable farming.  
 
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round on world trade,46 the EU 
was forced to agree a reduction on the value of export subsidies. It 
was also required to reach minimum access commitments for food 
from the developing world and to reduce domestic support payments 
that depended on the amount of food grown. These obligations have 
had a profound effect on the EU’s review in 2003 of CAP reform, 
also known as the EU Mid-Term Review (MTR). The MTR, with 
some minor exceptions, did not alter the level of market price 
                                                 
45 European Commission DG Agriculture, ‘Common Agricultural Policy explained’, 
October 2004. 
46 In the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, predecessor to 
the WTO. 
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support provided to EU farmers, notably leaving the two CAP 
‘untouchables’ – dairy and sugar – largely untouched. 
 
Critics of the CAP highlight that it makes wealthy European 
agribusinesses wealthier still and denies subsistence farmers in the 
developing world a chance to make a living. Wealthy individual 
British landowners do very well out of the CAP, in some cases 
netting more than £500,000 a year in public money. In one year, 
Tate & Lyle was the single largest beneficiary in England, with its 
various subsidiaries netting a total of just over £127 million. 
 
In Spain in 2003, seven big landowners received a total of over EUR 
14 million in farm subsidies. This is roughly the same amount that 
was shared among 12,700 smaller Spanish farms that same year 
(equivalent to the combined annual income of 90,000 peasants in 
Mozambique).47 According to Oxfam Spain, the ‘concentration of aid 
among the largest farmers has hurt family farms, 147,000 of which 
disappeared in Spain between 1999 and 2003’. 
 
There are few up-to-date analyses of the impact of CAP on the 
European economies. Apart from data limitations, there is the 
question of the time delay between release of aggregated data and 
academic analysis. For example, a study published in March 2005 
could only analyse data from 1988 to 2003 up to the end of 2003 
and then only for the EU-15, not the full 2005 membership of 25.48  
 
In terms of transfers to individual farmers, the study results were 
surprising. Such payments increased in size at the same time as the 
number of recipients declined. This meant a ‘sharp increase in the 
CAP transfers per person employed in the European agriculture (full 
time equivalent) from 6,600 euros in 1988/89 to 14,530 euros in 
2002/03’. The study noted that there were significant differences 
between the distribution of this subsidy: a full time farmer in Denmark 
received eleven times more euros compared to a full time farmer in 
                                                 
47 Tito Drago, ‘AGRICULTURE-EU: Subsidies Hurt Poor Nations, Short-Change 
Family Farms, Says Oxfam’, Inter Press Service News Agency, 18 March 2005, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=27935. 
48 See George P. Zanias, ‘Who Benefits from the CAP?’, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00003070/01/WHO_BENEFITS_FROM_THE_CAP.pdf. 
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Portugal.49 Producers in the UK, just below Denmark in this 
measure, receive the second highest amount. 
 
There is an unstated assumption among many EU members that the 
subsidies within the CAP can only be addressed within the 
framework of agricultural and trade policy. It is this assumption that 
underpins the complex negotiating position of the EU on the 
liberalisation of agricultural policy, including trade, within the WTO. 
There are many good reasons, some already mentioned, for 
rejecting this presumption and attempting to find new approaches to 
CAP by considering cross-cutting issues, especially those arising 
from energy security and environmental concerns. 
 
Two academic studies on how the CAP has been constituted throw 
some light on this possibility. The first argues that: 
 
 The CAP is not as sectorised a policy field as it is commonly 
considered to be; 
 The European Parliament has a role to play as an agent of 
change within the CAP; 
 Change within the CAP is largely brought about by 
endogenous dynamics (internal to the EU) rather than 
exogenous ones.50 
 
The second argues that in addition to ‘certain characteristics of the 
supply and demand of agricultural goods’, one of the biggest 
determinants of the persistence of CAP subsidies is the ‘permanent 
income’ problem of farmers, backed up by their homogeneous 
preferences.51 Low profit margins in traditional agriculture drive 
farmers (especially the big ones) to organise themselves to become 
‘political rent-seekers’. There are several reinforcing factors. First, 
the farmers have great success in avoiding ‘free-riding’ because of 
the existence of a number of selective incentives. Second, politicians 
and bureaucrats are motivated to supply farmers with public support. 
                                                 
49 Ibid. p.10. 
50 See Kennet Lynggaard, ‘The Institutional Construction of a Policy Field: Illustrations 
from the Common Agricultural Policy’, paper presented at the European Union Studies 
Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference: 2005 (9th), 31 March-2 April 2005. 
51 Peter Nedergaard, ‘Market failures and government failures: A theoretical model 
of the common agricultural policy’, Paper for the EUSA Ninth Biennial International 
Conference, 31 March-2 April 2005, Austin, Texas, http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/ 
00002986/ 02/CAP-teori-_ENDL.UDG_-_tilpasset_PC.doc. 
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Third, the ‘expected opponents of agricultural support’, such as 
consumers and taxpayers, ‘are too weakly organised and too little 
interested in making any forceful counterweight to farmers and 
agricultural politicians’. 
 
The study found that the ‘general asymmetry between farmers and 
consumers is sharpened in the CAP because it is possible to push 
the costs of expansion of agricultural production to other Member 
States and countries outside the EU’. The study noted that ‘many of 
the institutionalised counter-weights that exist at the national level, 
are either very weak or do not exist at the European level’. The study 
observed that ‘this is why the political system of the European Union 
could be characterised as a ‘super asymmetric’ political system as 
far as agricultural policy decisions are concerned’. 
 
Most importantly, the study notes that one of the biggest obstacles to 
CAP reform may be ‘rational entrepreneurs’ within the EU, such as 
the Commission. 
 
Taken together, these academic studies suggest that EU leaders can 
afford to make a strategic adjustment in their view of what CAP 
represents and that there is much greater room for rapid reform of 
CAP than they have been willing to admit. But to bring about radical 
and rapid reform of CAP, they must mobilise non-rural voters behind 
reform and take on the bureaucratic and political organisations that 
‘irrationally’ represent themselves as protectors of farmers’ incomes. 
CAP Secrecy: A European Disgrace 
More fundamentally, the CAP is a policy shrouded in secrecy. As an 
Oxfam study noted in 2004, ‘in no other sector do taxpayers spend 
so much and have so few rights to information about the use of their 
money’.52 The Commission refuses to release data on who receives 
the payments and the size of individual payments. The Commission 
says that the responsibility lies with the member states, but most of 
them likewise refuse to reveal the data. It was only in 2004, under 
pressure from a number of groups, including the Foreign Policy 
Centre, that the UK released its figures for the two preceding years. 
                                                 
52 Oxfam, Spotlight on Subsidies: Cereal Injustice under the CAP in Britain, Briefing 
Paper No. 55, January 2004, p. 1, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/ 
downloads/bp55_subsidies.pdf. 
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The data revealed that out of more than 100,000 recipients in 
England, 2,269 received more than £100,000 in 2004, while 17,000 
farms received less than £1000. 
Stimulus Packages for Rural Development 
CAP subsidies only have the potential to affect one element in the 
bioenergy chain – feedstock production. Yet, successful policy must 
encourage market take-up through processing and distribution 
stages. Policy towards energy crops has hitherto failed to align 
incentives to produce crops with frameworks in which to process and 
distribute them. New stimulus packages for biomass energy taken as 
part of CAP reform will need to look ‘beyond the farm’ to the broader 
‘commercial communities’ in which the farms are situated. 
 
Due to the predominantly decentralised implementation of biomass 
and feedstock high-transportation costs, industry development 
should focus at regional level, working to encourage local 
processing/distribution mechanisms and investment. Stimulus 
packages for rural development must embrace all aspects of local 
rural communities and be far-sighted enough to convince both 
farming and investment communities that the industry will endure 
and grow.  
 
As mentioned above, the UK Biomass Task Force found that energy 
crops ‘have been a victim of the stop-start approach to biomass 
energy’ inflicted by Government: ‘this has created uncertainty in the 
industry and has not led to the level of progress needed to pull 
through the new varieties which have been in development’. Future 
approaches to rural community development take-up must therefore 
be far-sighted, providing guarantees for investors and farmers alike 
that government support will be sustained for the next 15 to 20 
years.  
 
One study commissioned by Scottish regional councils illustrates the 
need for a more holistic approach to biofuel production at local 
level.53 While Scottish agriculture is well-suited to growing oilseed 
rape, there are no processing facilities in Scotland for conversion to 
                                                 
53 SAC Consultancy Division, Blue Prints for Profitable Farm Production in Post-CAP-
Reform Scotland, October 2005. 
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biofuel, and crops must be transported either south or to the 
continent for crushing. This leads to lower rape prices and places 
Scottish growers at a disadvantage. The report makes a number of 
recommendations, centred on the need for local plants and creating 
an atmosphere of co-operation and confidence in the industry. 
 
Risk involved in investing in a biofuel plant can be reduced 
considerably by forming a joint-venture company which would bring 
together all elements of the production chain. The New Generation 
Co-operative (NGC) model, for example, has been used extensively 
in the USA and secures farmer involvement, thus supply of 
feedstocks.54 Co-operatives have the opportunity to join together in 
branding biofuel produce, promoting the locality of the feedstock 
source and generating a sense of loyalty in the community. 
 
Take-up partnerships could be modelled on the EU’s own Campaign 
for Take-off for renewable energy generally, and its successor 
Campaign for Sustainable Energy, which puts particular emphasis on 
the importance of partnership initiatives and pilot studies. 
 
Especially when dealing with domestic use, it is necessary to run a 
public awareness campaign to notify users that alternatives to gas 
and oil exist; that these can be cost-effective, and that grants to 
encourage uptake also exist. Overcoming public inertia is necessary 
before manufacturers will enter the marketplace in significant 
numbers and drive costs down. Rural constituencies will be 
important partners in that process. In early 2005, the UK announced 
a £12 million programme over two years to change public opinion on 
climate change, but this had not yet commenced by the end of the 
year nor was its projected linkage to promotion of renewables, like 
biomass, evident by that time either. At the same time, governments 
must introduce regulatory packages that will give commercial 
suppliers and investors in all parts of the production and distribution 
chain the necessary confidence about short, medium and long term 
                                                 
54 http://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/wholefarm/html/c5-112.html 
Unlike traditional cooperatives, in which start-up expenses are minimal and growth is 
financed through members’ retained earnings, permanent equity to fund NGC start-up 
and growth is financed through the sale of delivery rights. These delivery rights 
represent a member’s right to deliver a specific amount of commodities to the 
cooperative. Members benefit in proportion to their use, and nearly all NGCs are 
democratically controlled through one member, one vote. 
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regimes so that they can make the necessary decisions supportive of 
a move to biomasss energy. 
CAP Reform in Sugar: For Energy, Not Sweetness 
There is a strange disconnect between the development of 
alternative fuels in Europe and the picture on the other side of the 
Atlantic. The USA and Brazil have a vibrant ethanol industry 
(produced from sugar and wheat) and use significant amounts of it in 
their transport fuels. By contrast, Europe has a weak ethanol 
industry. There is vast potential to develop an ethanol industry in 
Europe. 
 
Wheat and sugar beet are grown throughout the EU and can be 
used for the production of bioethanol, yet only 446,140 tons were 
produced in 2003. In the EU25, 14 per cent of land55 is dedicated to 
wheat, 1.5 per cent is dedicated to sugar beet. Sugar beet yields 
substantially more ethanol per hectare than wheat and is slightly 
cheaper to produce. The potential ethanol yield for wheat across this 
region is 2,323 litres/hectare in old member states. For sugar beet it 
is 6,331 litres/hectare in the EU15. Production levels are slightly 
lower in new member states. BTG Biomass technology group 
assumes that if priority is given to effective land use, 70 per cent of 
bio-ethanol would be produced from beet and 30 per cent from 
wheat.56 
 
What might the effect be if, for argument’s sake, all of the EU’s 
wheat and sugar were converted to bioethanol? 
 
European Commission statistics state that 23.384 million hectares of 
land were used for common wheat production across the EU25 in 
2004. If production efficiency in new member states were to match 
that of old member states, i.e. 2,323 litres per hectare, then 54.3 
billion litres of ethanol could be produced across the EU from wheat. 
Similarly, 2.416 million hectares of land were used to produce sugar 
beet in the EU25 in 2004. Taking potential yield to be 6,331 
litres/hectare, potential EU ethanol production could be 15.3 billion 
                                                 
55 The total area of land is what the EU defines as the Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA). 
56  BTG biomass technology group BV, Bio-energy’s role in the EU Energy market: A 
view of developments until 2020, 2004. 
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litres per year. (For comparison, from the 1996-1997 harvest, Brazil 
produced 14.16 billion litres of ethanol.)57 
 
The potential of wheat and sugar to contribute to the European 
transport industry is significant. Of course, this model pushes the 
equation to extremes, neglecting issues of diversified land use, 
biodiversity and food security. Yet, it is useful in order to illustrate 
that the EU has much more indigenous transport fuel at its disposal 
than is often perceived. It also demonstrates that the EU’s indicative 
targets for the take-up of biofuels (two per cent by 2005 and 5.75 per 
cent by 2010) are very achievable, indeed modest. 
 
The EU CAP sugar policy is worth over £1 billion annually and is the 
‘worst’ remaining excess of CAP policy. Its inflated price guarantees, 
export refunds and high import tariffs around sugar production are 
criticised by aid agencies as one of the most damaging trade 
distortions for the developing world. The guaranteed price within the 
EU is three times higher than the world price of EUR 157 per ton.  
 
One of the best independent analyses of the distorting effect of EU 
(and US and Japanese) sugar subsidies is a 2004 World bank 
Study.58 It assesses global gains to all from liberalised sugar trade, 
concluding for example in the case of Brazil: 
 
Brazilian producers gain the most from liberalization, around 
$2.6 billion per year, but this is offset by a loss of $1 billion to 
Brazilian consumers who pay higher prices after 
liberalization – leaving a net gain of $1.6 billion for Brazil. 
 
Oxfam estimates the price system gives the 27 largest sugar beet 
farmers in the UK an average of £137,595 a year of support. 
Production of sugar cane in the developing world is much cheaper 
than in Europe, but import duties create a tariff that has risen to as 
much as 150 per cent in 2003. (The effective tariff depends on world 
prices and varies over time.) While every household in the EU pays 
EUR 64 a year to support the sugar regime, two-thirds of people in 
                                                 
57 G.M. Zanin and others, Brazilian bioethanol program, Chemical Engineering 
Department, State University of Maringa, Brazil, 2000. 
58 Donald Mitchell, ‘Sugar Policies: Opportunities for Change’, World Bank 
Development Prospects Group, February 2004, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/06/01/000009486_200
40601165704/Rendered/PDF/wps3222sugar.pdf. 
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Mozambique − a country with a potentially lucrative sugar industry − 
live on less than $2 a day. An estimated 20,000 jobs could be 
created in Mozambique if sugar trade distortions were scrapped.59 
Technology Flows to Poorer Countries 
In its Biomass Action Plan of 7 December 2005, the EU committed 
itself to support developing countries make greater use of biomass 
energy. But there is a long way to travel in this area. Most EU effort 
in energy for developing countries is concentrated in non-renewable 
sources. 
 
International institutions have only in recent years addressed means 
of promoting renewables internationally. The World Summit for 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 acknowledged 
for the first time that renewable energy is key to addressing not only 
climate change, but also poverty and economic development in 
poorer regions of the world. 
 
The 2002 WSSD debated the following issues, but progress on all of 
them has been lacklustre: 
 
 Proposals to set targets and timetables for the adoption of 
renewable and other clean sources of energy – including a 
proposal to ensure that renewable energy accounts for up to 
15 percent of global energy supply by 2010; 
 Language urging nations to phase out energy subsidies – 
including a proposal that developed countries reduce energy 
subsidies substantially by 2007; 
 Efforts to encourage the transfer of environmentally-sound 
energy technologies to developing countries – including on 
preferential and concessional terms; 
 Efforts to advance early ratification and implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, as well as greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions. 
 
                                                 
59 Maxine Frith, ‘Bitter Harvest: How EU Sugar Subsidies Devastate Africa’, The 
Independent, 22 June 2005. 
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At WSSD, the EU launched an Energy Initiative which aims to 
encourage discussion and cooperation to integrate energy issues 
more effectively into relations with developing countries. The 
initiative seeks to contribute to providing the access to energy 
necessary for the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals.60 Its other goals are: 
 
 To raise political awareness among high level decision 
makers of the important role energy can play in poverty 
reduction; 
 To clarify the need for energy services for poverty 
reduction and sustainable development; 
 To make apparent the need for energy services in 
national/regional development strategies; 
 To encourage the coherence and synergy of energy-
related activities; 
 To stimulate new resources (capital, technology, human 
resources) from the private sector, financial institutions, 
civil society and endusers. 
 
The initiative foreshadowed actions at national, regional and 
international level in partnership with all public and private players. 
The proposed actions were to include: 
 
 Institutional capacity building; 
 Transfer of knowledge and skills; 
 Technical cooperation; 
 Market development. 
 
The Initiative was intended to lead to an increase in financial aid for 
the energy sector in the developing countries. The Energy Initiative 
established the European Union Energy Facility, which has a budget 
of EUR 220 million, available as of 2006. It is designed to promote 
investment in energy services for those living under the poverty line.  
This fund is augmented by other funds for renewables, such as 
‘Intelligent Energy – Europe’ and the ‘Partnership and Dialogue 
Facility’. The facility is also supplemented by energy spending in 
normal EU development assistance programmes. 
 
                                                 
60 For details see http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12008.htm. 
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The new EU effort to support energy programmes under the initiative 
has however been quite slow, with one source noting in August 2005 
that ‘three years after the launch of the EU Energy Initiative for 
Poverty Alleviation, this initiative is gradually starting to operate. Its 
one-person secretariat in the EU Commission's General Directorate 
for Development (DG Development) has been expanded gradually to 
three persons’.61 But the EU programme is demand-driven. The EU 
cannot impose an agenda on its development partners. 
 
There is not a ‘one size fits all’ solution. Assessing the effectiveness 
of improving energy infrastructure is difficult, especially when dealing 
with technologies that do not generate electricity. There is a plethora 
of biomass technologies, all with different roles, advantages and 
suited to different situations. Comparison is difficult. Nevertheless, 
action is possible if one builds upon the existing deployment of 
biomass in the developing world and its particular strength: small 
scale heat generation. 
 
It is necessary to encourage localised, sustainable schemes for rural 
areas independently of national supply and distribution chains. The 
EU is ideally placed to provide training, certification and technical 
assistance for the development and roll-out of low capital cost 
measures such as fuel-efficient stoves. NGOs have already scored 
important successes in this field.62 
 
Expanding the awareness of larger-scale biomass technologies for 
more developed areas is also of importance, especially where 
feedstock can be produced from agricultural waste (such as at sugar 
mills). However, competition from cheaper, possibly non-renewable 
sources of energy makes this a more difficult avenue to pursue, 
especially considering the relatively high capital costs of many 
advanced biomass technologies. 
 
The Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition will hopefully go 
some way to addressing the capital barriers to more advanced 
technologies, but it must be remembered that biomass will be 
competing with other renewable technologies possibly more suited to 
                                                 
61 See International Network for Sustainable Energy, August 2005, 
http://www.inforse.dk/europe/eu_einitiative.htm. 
62 Oxfam, ‘Stop the Dumping!’, Briefing Paper, 2002, p. 31, 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/where_we_work/sudan/emergency/stoves.htm. 
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large, centralised generation projects. Even on a small scale, the 
advantages of rapidly deployable, flexible solar/wind generators are 
considerable when it comes to electricity generation. 
 
One area the EU could concentrate on is the promotion of small and 
medium-scale decentralised power generation from biomass. The 
savings in transmission and distribution costs can be weighed 
against the initial capital cost. Hybrid, remote area power systems 
(HRAPS), which capture energy from various renewable energy 
sources, have particular potential if supported through investment of 
funds and expertise. 
 
In order to promote better use of biomass in poorer countries, the EU 
will have to work with other governments in making energy markets 
more transparent and through providing consistent access to new 
technologies. To this end, cooperation has to be established 
between public institutions, the private sector and international 
organisations such as the European Union. The development of 
regional energy infrastructures can offer the benefits of economies of 
scale, especially in small developing countries. Sharing the 
development and management of infrastructures can reduce 
transaction costs and improve competitiveness.  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Most political leaders have probably heard of biomass energy, but 
few see it as a serious element in their considerations of energy 
security. Politicians need to become more familiar with the existing 
potential of energy farming and learn to say ‘biomass energy’. The 
lack of awareness among political leaders in Europe of the extent of 
existing commercial production of biomass energy, both globally and 
in Europe, is extreme. There is little awareness of its potential, if 
supported by appropriate policy settings, to take a much larger share 
of the energy consumption in transport and heating. If the EU is 
looking for growth industries, this is one. The growth rate for biofuel 
production in 2004 compared with 2003 was 27.5 per cent.63 
 
                                                 
63 See ‘Le Baromètre des biocarburants’, Systémes solaires, No. 167, June 2005, p. 
39. 
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Looking ahead, EU leaders need to understand the three main 
determinants of future take-up of biomass energy:  
 
 Technological innovation; 
 Supply of bioenergy (availability of resource and supply 
chain); 
 Demand for bioenergy (with consumer and regulatory 
aspects). 
 
EU leaders need regimes which stimulate all three factors. 
 
An important area for future research to help leaders move in this 
direction would be a comparative analysis of legislative regimes from 
around the world designed to promote biomass uptake. The IEA 
database on Global Renewable Energy Policy and Measures 
provides a comprehensive documentary foundation for this 
analysis.64 The work would need to be supported by specialists with 
country and sector expertise. 
 
The EU can and should move a large slice of the funding for its price 
support of agricultural products (especially for sugar) to measures 
that support the development of a biomass energy market. In so 
doing, the EU must resist pressure to impose trade restrictive or 
trade distorting measures. In making this shift, the EU must also 
avoid the imposition of complex new bureaucratic procedures. 
 
As the UK Biomass Task Force has noted, ‘keys to success include 
long-term messages, consistent support for implementation through 
capital grants or revenue support and appropriate use of regulation’. 
But above all, EU leaders must ‘learn to love their biomass’. 
 
There is huge potential and high political demand for the EU to shift 
the money that currently supports sugar production into measures to 
promote the large scale development of an ethanol industry. (Unlike 
the USA and Brazil, the EU has only a small ethanol industry.) If 
such a move were to be undertaken, the EU would need to break 
new ground in policy coordination between the transport and 
agriculture policy areas.    
 
                                                 
64 See http://www.iea.org/textbase/pamsdb/grindex.aspx. 
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Thus, in giving a new boost to its biomass energy industry, the EU 
and its member states must take a global perspective of the issues. 
They must consider its competitive edge in the biomass energy 
industry from a liberalised trade perspective consistent with WTO 
rules and aspirations. They must also consider the impact of a more 
rapid shift to biomass energy on its climate change policies and its 
energy security. There are clear but underdeveloped synergies 
between greater biomass energy production and the rural 
development objectives of the CAP. There are gains to be made in 
energy security from the decentralisation of supply that greater use 
of some forms of biomass energy can provide. 
 
The EU is facing historic choices in how it manages farm support, 
energy use and climate change mitigation. As it moves toward 
completion of the single market in energy and as it moves toward 
liberalised world trade (in both agriculture and services), it must 
decide how it will handle a number of convergent interests around 
biomass energy. In particular, it must ensure that its institutional 
foundations are adequate to the task. It is not reassuring that 
agriculture and energy policy are currently managed in near total 
isolation both in the Commission and most member states.  
 
The EU faces the dilemma of allowing national priorities and 
disaggregated interest groups (such as the agriculture lobby) to set 
the agenda or trying to set a unified pan-European, integrated 
approach. The considerations raised in this pamphlet suggest that 
the latter course is the only viable one. Of course, national 
governments throughout the EU, like local governments and 
community stakeholders, especially farmers’ groups, will be a vital 
part of framing forward action. But there needs to be a common EU 
vision.  
 
There are now many recommendations on the table for both reform 
of CAP and reform of EU approaches to biomass energy. The EU 
has set out its approach on the latter in releasing its Biomass Action 
Plan. But the policy choices that flow from that need to be informed 
by consideration of the WTO talks on trade liberalisation and the EU 
commitment to eliminate farm trade subsidies by 2013. The Biomass 
Action Plan is a conservative document that under-rates the potential 
of EU biomass energy production, especially from sugar and wheat, 
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and takes no account of the need for CAP reform inherent in the 
2013 WTO commitment. 
 
This pamphlet does not seek to replicate the many specific 
recommendations on linking farm subsidies to greater support for 
biomass that are already on the table through various mechanisms. 
Rather, the pamphlet identifies several strategic recommendations 
for EU leaders, including the parliament. The strategic 
recommendations are followed by some sample measures that could 
be implemented fairly promptly. 
 
The EU should commit now to additional and urgent reform 
measures in the CAP that promote rapid take-up of biomass 
energy use in ways that reduce the negative effects on 
agricultural trade of poorer countries created by price 
subsidies. This would help solve the contradiction between its farms 
subsidies which hurt many developing countries and its aid policies 
designed to help them. Such a commitment would also boost EU 
chances of meeting its climate change mitigation objectives. The 
commitment would also enhance EU energy security. But most 
importantly, such a commitment would provide important new rural 
development opportunities. 
 
Leading members of the EU that support a radical overhaul of 
CAP and of the EU budget (such as the UK) should commission 
a specialist assessment of the way in which farm subsidies 
under CAP might be shifted to vigorous promotion of biomass 
production as part of a comprehensive package of rural 
development measures. The study would be all the more credible if 
it engaged a wide number of stakeholders in Europe, but the 
documentation received already for the Commission consultation on 
the Biomass Action Plan and the Plan itself, released in December 
2005, provide a good start point. The time frame for such a study 
should be six months. Like-minded states who want significant 
budget reform in the EU, such as the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, 
Sweden and France should form a working group. 
 
EU leaders must not limit their consideration of CAP reform 
only to agricultural issues and therefore must not allow DG 
Agriculture in the Commission to lead further policy work on the 
bigger budget issues. This is a question of the future direction of 
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the EU budget as a whole. One lesson of the Dutch referendum on 
the Constitution is that EU leaders have to find an answer posed by 
the No campaign: why does each Dutch person provide EUR 180 
per year to the EU’s budget, of which 40 per cent goes to CAP? 
There is now a new political imperative to revisit the entire CAP 
subsidy framework.  
 
Studies of the institutional development of CAP referenced in this 
pamphlet suggest that the biggest influences for change might be 
internal to the EU institutions, rather than external, and that a sense 
of crisis is needed before fundamental policy change can be brought 
about.    
 
Work on the bigger budget, energy and rural development issues 
should proceed hand in hand with work on the best mechanisms for 
bringing about the changes. This work is best led within the 
Commission by DG Agriculture but it must be supported by a robust 
engagement of leading member states and community groups. 
 
Several areas of policy stand out for immediate attention. Subsidies 
(price support payments or even ‘single farm payments’) for biomass 
production are not the answer. 
 
Measures that support investment in processing facilities, especially 
large scale generating plants, and distribution will be important. The 
best method of support for this will be to provide tax and other 
financial incentives for the formation of joint-venture companies or 
local cooperatives which would bring together all elements of the 
production chain. The whole chain requires the co-ordination of 
various governmental departments − those concerned with 
agriculture, environment and electricity generation − to ensure that 
construction of new production and distribution networks is not 
stalled waiting for one link to be developed. In addition, it is 
necessary to ensure that investors, generating companies and agri-
business are communicating effectively, so that once the policy 
measures are in place the effects are actually delivered. 
 
Beyond this basic approach, more complex measures, such as 
providing some form of tradable credits in biomass energy, might 
allow for the operation of market forces. Not only do these remove 
the need for large amounts of government intervention, but it is quite 
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possible to make them tradable across member states, allowing 
movement towards a single energy market. The delivering of security 
to investors through a guaranteed price (such as a feed in tariff) will 
have undesirable long term outcomes in terms of developments in 
technology and efficiency and is likely to hamper chances to expand 
and amalgamate energy markets.  
 
The EU must use its own more rapid shift to biomass use as a 
new lever of change in its support policies to developing 
countries seeking energy security. The EU must make renewable 
energy programmes a higher priority in its development assistance. 
In Africa, where the EU has just promised to double aid 
disbursements for the next five years, the EU could agree to spend 
ten per cent of the new funds (some $2 billion per year) on promotion 
of new biomass crop plantings and more efficient biomass energy 
production. 
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